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Few companies invested more effort in risk management than Country-wide Financial. In 2007, the Insti-tute of Internal Auditors praised 
Countrywide for its comprehensive enter-
prise risk management program, which in-
volved 45 risk management professionals, 
supplemented by 112 internal auditors, as-
sessing 530 risk matrices, 9,500 risks and 
27,000 controls. “Countrywide’s program is 
truly best practice,” stated Internal Auditor 
magazine at the time.
A year after that glowing pronouncement, 
Countrywide was acquired by Bank of America 
in 2008, having essentially gone bankrupt due 
to unwise risk-taking in the subprime lending 
market. How could a company with such an 
exhaustive system of risk identification, as-
sessment and evaluation succumb to the very 
thing that it had gone to such lengths to avoid?
Our observations of risk-management 
practices point to a critical problem: manag-
ers often turn risk management into a mas-
sive paper-processing exercise. They become 
so busy identifying and evaluating every pos-
sible kind of risk facing their businesses that 
they miss the forest for the trees. 
Instead, we believe that managers should 
focus on the risks that really matter – namely, 
strategic risks that threaten their firm’s exis-
tence. In this article, we suggest a different 
way to identify and manage risk, offering nine 
practical tips to help you manage your risks 
strategically.
By PHILIP BROMILEY and DEVAKI RAU
A Better Way of 
Managing Major Risks
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Enterprise Risk Management: 
An Imperfect Science
Conventional wisdom on risk management 
suggests that firms manage their risks most ef-
fectively when they consider them as a portfo-
lio. As portfolios generally have less risk than 
the underlying components, managing risks 
this way can result in lower risk-mitigation 
costs than managing risks individually. 
For example, one business division might 
have a positive exposure to an exchange rate 
and another a negative, but taken together, the 
two could cancel each other out, leaving no 
corporate exposure to that exchange rate. 
However, the risk of a portfolio depends 
critically on the correlations among the risks. 
Combining highly correlated risks offers little 
benefit in a portfolio, while combining uncor-
related risks can result in a portfolio risk far 
below the risk of its constituent parts. 
This approach – termed Enterprise Risk 
Management or ERM – involves assessing 
all the risks facing a firm, classifying them by 
their probability and impact, and determining 
which actions to take to mitigate or control 
them. A firm might identify operational risks 
at the subsidiary level, the business unit level 
and the division level. After identifying these 
risks, the firm would assess the likelihood and 
consequence of their occurrence. It would 
then identify how to respond to these risks in 
the context of the firm’s internal environment, 
control systems, communication processes 
and so on.
Note that not all risks need to be treated as 
something to be mitigated or controlled. A firm 
with an advantage in addressing a specific kind 
of risk should explore ways to profit from that 
advantage.
Although attractive in principle, this ap-
proach has problems. First, ERM entails enor-
mous effort. The job of identifying risks arising 
from firm operations at a variety of levels can 
be an immense undertaking. 
Take the three-dimensional matrix or risk 
cube (see Exhibit 1) frequently used to depict 
the various interrelated levels of risk facing an 
enterprise. The eight main components of risk 
times the four categories of business objectives 
times the four business levels yield 128 differ-
ent managerial considerations – and that’s just 
for one kind of risk! Because there are so many 
enterprise risks, a firm can easily identify tens 
of thousands of potential risks, like Country-
wide did. 
And that’s only the start. Next, managers 
need to assess the likelihood and consequence 
of those risks occurring. To handle these risks 
as a portfolio requires that managers know the 
distributions and correlations of the possible 
outcomes. Outside of financial investments, 
managers seldom have sufficient data for 
these estimates. Often, the most they can do is 
guess the likelihood of a risk occurring on, say, 
a scale of 1 to 5. The benefits of treating risks as 
a portfolio depend on the correlations among 
the underlying risks, yet managers seldom have 
legitimate data to estimate such correlations 
accurately or meaningfully.
Finally, managers should ask the same 
question about ERM that they would ask about 
In trying to identify all the 
risks a firm faces, managers 
can turn risk management into 
an overwhelming paper-pro-
cessing exercise that distracts 
them from focusing on the risks 
that really matter – namely, 
strategic ones that threaten the 
firm’s existence. By not being 
able to grasp the assumptions 
and limitations of complex and 
costly Enterprise Risk Manage-
ment (ERM) tools and models, 
managers may be operating 
under a false sense of security. 
Based on their research on firm 
risk-taking and risk manage-
ment, the authors offer nine 
practical suggestions to help 
managers make the risk func-
tion more meaningful and 
relevant. A healthy dose of 
skepticism, prudence and resil-
ience will go a long way toward 
helping your firm see the forest 
rather than the trees.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Do firms want – or even need – to enumerate and 
evaluate each and every risk they could possibly face? 
Or do they just care about the big ones that might cause 
them to go bankrupt or face serious distress? 
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any other business practice: what is the return 
on investment for this activity? 
We have little evidence that ERM practices 
actually reduce risk, let alone justify the cost 
of implementing ERM practices. Any manager 
can take steps to reduce risk. But the real man-
agement challenge lies in judging the trade-
offs between risk reduction vs. reduction in 
expected performance.
Strategic Risks: A Different 
Approach
Given the inherent difficulty, if not impossi-
bility, of ever fully identifying, assessing and 
evaluating all the risks that could ever have an 
impact on your business, we would argue that 
managers would do better to focus on strate-
gic risks – those that pose the biggest threats 
to your company’s existence.
This shift of emphasis comes from an ex-
amination of what firms really want from risk 
management. Do firms want – or even need – to 
enumerate and evaluate each and every risk the 
firm could possibly face? Or do firms just care 
about the big risks – the ones that might cause 
the firm to go bankrupt or face serious distress? 
Let us distinguish between strategic and 
operational risks. Put simply, managers must 
address strategic risks because they threaten 
the performance or survival of the firm, where-
as managers should address operational risks 
when doing so improves expected returns.
Take a banking example. On the one hand, 
a bank need not be overly afraid of the risk per 
se associated with small loans (an operational 
risk) – though it should be concerned that the 
interest rate charged is sufficient that the loan 
has positive expected returns. On the other 
hand, the bank should worry about the overall 
risk of its loan portfolio or its trading activities 
because either of those constitutes a strategic 
risk that could kill the bank. 
Likewise, in a production environment, 
the defect rate is a form of operational risk 
that should be managed when it pays to do so, 
but major product liability issues are strategic 
risks that could seriously damage the company.
Most firms really want risk management 
to help the firm avoid crises that threaten its 
survival. However, barring regulators and con-
sultants, risk management is probably not the 
single most urgent or pressing concern weigh-
ing on managers’ minds. Profits probably mat-
ter more, since profits are real while risks are 
only estimates. 
Moreover, the central ideas underlying the 
concept of risk are rather slippery. For exam-
ple, how does one define “risk”? Is it the size of 
potential loss, the probability of potential loss 
or some combination of the two? Do your risk 
estimates depend on historical data (assuming 
such data exist) or the gut feelings of your man-
agers? If your risk estimates depend heavily on 
managerial judgment, they will almost always 
be biased. 
Forecasting is a case in point (after all, a 
risk assessment is essentially a forecast of 
risk). While forecasting can be quite accurate 
in well-understood, repeatable environments, 
it can be quite problematic in novel or less un-
derstood domains. The track record for new 
product introductions suggests that 9 out of 10 
fail, but 10 out of 10 were predicted to succeed. 
Likewise, most observers estimate that 5 out 
of 10 corporate acquisitions fail, when again 10 
out of 10 were predicted to succeed, at least by 
the managers who made those decisions. 
There is no reason to believe that manag-
ers are better at estimating risks than they are 
at forecasting other non-repeated items like 
these. Even ignoring the distorting effect of 
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incentives and organization-specific issues, 
research on behavioral decision theory con-
sistently demonstrates that people, including 
professional analysts, are terrible intuitive 
statisticians. Depending on extraneous fac-
tors, they systematically over- or underesti-
mate the likelihood that a particular outcome 
will occur. 
Even if your firm could collect relatively 
accurate data, free from any managerial bias, 
you would still face the problem of what to do 
with such information. Few managers have the 
technical expertise and competence required 
to identify and use the right tools to estimate 
risk from these data.
Given that managing risk has both direct 
costs (in forgone earnings) and indirect costs 
(in managerial time), executives need to think 
long and hard about how much risk manage-
ment they need. Rather than trying to identify 
and manage a host of risks, you may be better 
off focusing on the strategic ones that could 
potentially sink your firm (see Exhibit 2). Here 
we offer nine tips to help you do that.
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ABOUT THE AUTHORS
1  RECOGNIZE WHERE THE REAL PROBLEM LIES
Sometimes the problem is not risk manage-
ment but management. Many observers attri-
bute the recent financial crisis to inadequate 
risk management by banks and other financial 
institutions. In some cases, however, the prob-
lem was not risk management per se but man-
agement decisions that ignored or overruled 
warnings from the risk management function. 
As previously mentioned, Countrywide had 
an extremely sophisticated risk management 
system. But it was Countrywide’s management 
who publicly stated that the company would 
match any loan made by a competitor. 
The same goes for New Century Financial, 
another big provider of subprime mortgages in 
the United States. In their article “New Centu-
ry Financial: Lessons Learned,” Michael J. Mis-
sal and Lisa M. Richman note that it wasn’t that 
the risks weren’t being detected: they were. “In 
fact, a number of board members were open-
ly disdainful of certain members of senior 
management, and challenged their integrity 
and competence.” The “unhealthy friction” 
between the board and senior management 
“inhibited an open flow of information … and 
restricted the ability of New Century to react 
nimbly and effectively to the rapidly deterio-
rating subprime market.” Internal auditors at 
New Century repeatedly objected to the riski-
ness of the loans being made, but management 
did not respond.
2  BE SKEPTICAL OF SOPHISTICATED RISK MODELS
Wall Street banks, among the most sophisti-
cated risk managers in the world, led us into 
the 2008 recession. These banks may have 
taken too many risks with subprime mortgages 
precisely because they relied on sophisticated 
risk-management systems that used formal, 
extremely elaborate models. These models 
gave managers an unjustified sense of security 
Even if your firm could collect accurate data, free from 
any bias, you would still face the problem of what to do 
with such information. Few managers have the expertise 
and competence to estimate risk from these data.
A Better Way of Managing Major Risks
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about their risk assessments. 
Sophisticated models may appear to make 
uncertainty magically disappear – particu-
larly when the managers who use them gloss 
over or view with unquestioning reverence 
the details of the underlying analyses. Indeed, 
Wall Street banks and investment firms were 
hiring rocket scientists and similarly trained 
individuals who, with a very limited under-
standing of the lending system, produced risk 
models that the average manager had little 
chance of understanding.
Here’s a simple example: Suppose you make 
10,000 products with a 5 percent chance of de-
fects. Or you give out 10,000 loans with a 5 per-
cent chance of default. Obviously, you would 
expect 500 defects or defaults on average, but 
how likely is it that you would encounter 600 
or more defects or defaults? 
If the defects or defaults are randomly dis-
tributed, the answer is .00045 percent. In other 
words, if you assume a 5 percent defect rate or 
default probability, your models will assure 
you that the chance of you seeing 600 defects 
or defaults is virtually nil. 
However, this analysis rests heavily on an 
assumed defect rate of 5 percent. If you err a 
little in predicting the defect rate, and the true 
defect rate is 6 percent, then 600 moves from 
impossible to the most likely outcome. 
A similar problem occurs with indepen-
dence. If borrowers default on loans random-
ly, then the estimate holds. But if these were 
home loans and some defaults lower the value 
of houses, thereby triggering more defaults 
as individuals with financial troubles can no 
longer sell their homes, then defaults are not 
independent. Likewise, if machines make de-
fects randomly, we have a good estimate, but 
if one malfunctioning machine results in many 
defects, then defects are correlated.
Few managers have the technical ability 
or time to evaluate risk-assessment models in 
depth. As a poor substitute, they should at least 
be skeptical.
3   BEWARE OF INCREASING RISK FOR PROFIT
One of the major problems with strategic risks 
is that they occur infrequently. If they didn’t, 
we would see a high percentage of firms going 
bankrupt every year. We have great difficulty 
estimating the probabilities of infrequent 
events. 
Strategic 
Risks
Operational 
Risks
Financial 
Risks
  Industry
  Economy
  Political Change
  Competitors
  Consumer 
Preference
  Market Share
  Reputation
  Brand Equity
  Strategic Focus
  Investor 
Confidence
  Customer 
Satisfaction
  Product Failure
  Supply Chain
  Sourcing
  Supplier 
Concentration
  Outsourcing
  Election Cycle
  Catastrophic Loss
  Process Execution
  Policies and 
Procedures
  Environmental
  Contract
  Regulatory and Legal
  Human Resources
  Health and Safety
  Authority
  Integrity
  Leadership and 
Empowerment
  Culture
  Performance 
Incentives
  Knowledge Capital
  Cash Flow
  Liquidity
  Availability
  Interest Rates
  Foreign Exchange 
Rates
  Credit Capacity
  Credit Concentration
  Credit Default
  Accounting
  Budgeting
  Taxation
  Pricing
  Performance 
Measurement
  Portfolio
  Systems 
Infrastructure
  Systems Access
  Systems Availability
  Data Integrity
  Data Relevance
Not All Risks Are Equal
THIS IS A LIST OF 50 RISKS IDENTIFIED BY ONE 
CONSULTANT. THE REAL QUESTION IS: WHICH OF 
THESE ARE THE STRATEGIC ONES FOR YOU? 
EXHIBIT 2
Sophisticated models may appear to make uncertainty 
magically disappear – particularly when the managers 
who use them gloss over or view with unquestioning 
reverence the details of the underlying analyses.
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How does this matter for organizations? 
Consider a manager making decisions. If the 
outcomes of his or her decisions are positive 
(or at least nothing goes wrong), the manager 
might see no harm in taking more risks the 
next time. At an organizational level, markets 
might push firms into increasing amounts of 
risk, eventually making them take on as much 
risk as their peers, just to stay in business. In-
crementally, the manager or firm can increase 
risk to undesirable levels.
In a safety example, NASA launches had in-
dicators of design problems but nothing went 
really wrong. Consequently, the organization 
kept taking risks – until a manned mission 
exploded.
In a banking example, before the crash, 
if a mortgage lender was not as generous as 
the most generous competitor in the market, 
the lender did not make loans. Each time a 
lender became more generous – by lowering 
underwriting standards or increasing the loan 
to house value – competitors were forced to 
match. If they didn’t, they were essentially out 
of business. 
Before the crash, lenders made winking 
references to “liar loans” (based on stated 
income) and “NINJA loans” (No Income, No 
Job or Assets) but a company that did not is-
sue these had difficulty staying in the market. 
Such creeping risk could occur in a variety 
of domains – from ancillary commitments 
to product warranties to product quality, 
where quality is not immediately evident to 
the buyer.
4   TRY SCENARIOS
One approach to identify strategic risks is 
scenario analysis. You start by identifying 
a few key variables on which there is uncer-
tainty. Then, you develop logically consis-
tent scenarios based on the different values 
of these key variables, and evaluate the major 
The point is not to develop detailed plans for every 
scenario, but to highlight major environmental risks in 
general, so that you can at least accommodate them in 
your strategic planning.
uncertainties in each case. Oil companies do 
this to anticipate the impact of drastically dif-
ferent oil prices: what happens if crude is $50, 
$100 or $150 per barrel? 
If you use scenarios to assess strategic 
risks, be aware of the general tendency to un-
derestimate the variability. In July 2014, when 
crude cost $110 a barrel, few would have given 
it much chance to be $30 a barrel by January 
2016, but this happened.
The point is not to develop detailed plans 
for every scenario, but to highlight major en-
vironmental risks in general, so that you can 
at least accommodate them in your strategic 
planning.
5   HOLD PREMORTEMS
In most companies, naysayers aren’t welcome. 
People prefer can-do managers. If the senior 
management team leans toward X, rare is the 
person who will stick his head above the para-
pet to voice arguments against X. And if X turns 
out to be wrong, no one likes the person who 
says, “I told you so.”
Writing in Harvard Business Review, Gary 
Klein proposes an alternative form of express-
ing concerns without becoming the smug 
Monday-morning quarterback. The opposite 
of a postmortem – in which problems are dis-
sected after they’ve occurred, when hindsight 
is always 20/20 – Klein’s premortem technique 
encourages people to point out all the ways 
that things could go wrong before any action 
is taken. 
Under this “prospective hindsight ap-
proach,” everyone assumes the failure of what-
ever is being proposed, and they spend their 
time developing potential reasons for that 
failure. With such reasons identified, manag-
ers can strengthen the plan. The premortem 
helps overcome the tendency of managers al-
ways looking on the bright side.
A Better Way of Managing Major Risks
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6  USE EXTERNAL COMPARISONS
Most risk analyses focus on the issue at hand 
and attempt to predict the future outcomes 
for that particular issue. However, such pre-
dictions often have systemic biases. Most of 
us are familiar with the tendency to underes-
timate how long tasks will take and how much 
they will cost. Much of this comes from esti-
mating the minimum expected time, if every-
thing goes according to plan, and not the actual 
expected time.
Managers can combat this tendency by us-
ing a comparable reference group. In estimat-
ing how long a project should take, create a list 
of roughly similar projects and look at how long 
they took. In estimating costs, do the same 
thing. These comparisons do not even have 
to be terribly close. Then you can adjust from 
your normal prediction, recognizing how long 
similar things have historically taken and how 
much they have cost.
7  PAY ATTENTION TO INCENTIVES
Risks in general, and strategic risks in particu-
lar, stem from managerial decisions that de-
pend heavily on incentives. While incentives 
have clear benefits, sometimes they work too 
well, especially when they are strong and the 
risk associated with the action is unmeasured 
or unmonitored. 
Securities trading is a prime example. Suc-
cessful risk-taking can result in hefty bonuses 
for individual traders, while the company 
bears the losses associated with unsuccessful 
risk-taking. An employee who has lost enough 
to end his or her career may take excessive 
risks, believing he or she has nothing to lose. 
Several banks have been destroyed by individ-
uals doubling-down on small losses to create 
catastrophes.
Apart from excessive risk-taking, ill-con-
ceived incentives can provoke the opposite 
problem: risk aversion. In most companies, the 
middle manager who takes a big risk that pays 
off may get a nice bonus and perhaps a promo-
tion, but if it turns out badly, he or she may get 
fired. With that kind of reward system, sensible 
managers will likely not take too many risks – 
even risks the company might want to take.
8  DON’T FORCE GROWTH
Sometimes strategic risks stem from a compa-
ny in a traditional industry setting extremely 
aggressive growth targets, based not on sound 
business logic but on arbitrary ambition. To 
meet these targets, the firm may pursue ac-
quisitions or other actions that increase its 
strategic risks. 
In their paper “Just Say No to Wall Street: 
Putting a Stop to the Earnings Game,” Joseph 
Fuller and Michael C. Jensen document the 
case of Nortel Networks, which between 1997 
and 2001 paid over $32 billion to acquire 19 
companies in an attempt to satisfy analysts’ 
growth expectations. The telecom company’s 
strategy was to transform itself from voice 
transmission to data networking, but it over-
extended itself, fueled by heady market valua-
tions. In the end, most of those acquired com-
panies were sold, shut down or written off. 
Nortel’s stock nosedived, it hemorrhaged staff 
and by 2009, the company had gone bankrupt.
9  BUILD A RESILIENT ORGANIZATION
Most organizations face an untold number of 
low-probability, high-impact events. Their 
low probabilities make identification and 
management of each potential event uneco-
nomic and infeasible. That said, given the large 
numbers of these potential events, the odds of 
one of them occurring are quite high. 
Instead of managing all these events, firms 
must build a capability to respond to unantici-
pated events. In other words, they must build 
Apart from excessive risk-taking, ill-conceived 
incentives can provoke the opposite problem: risk 
aversion. Managers will likely not take too many risks – 
even risks the company might want to take.
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a capacity for organizational resilience. Manag-
ers will always face surprises. Instead of trying 
to anticipate all the low-probability but high-
impact potential surprises, managers should 
focus on building systems and processes that 
allow their firms to recover quickly from them. 
A legendary tale in this regard is the time 
when lightning struck a Philips plant in March 
2000, causing a damaging fire that interrupt-
ed the supply of chips for Ericsson and Nokia 
cellphones. Though both Nokia and Ericsson 
estimated a one-week delay in chip deliveries, 
Nokia went further, holding daily discussions 
with Philips engineers. In doing so, Nokia dis-
covered that a week was an underestimate, and 
it quickly sought alternative suppliers. By the 
time Ericsson cottoned on, Nokia had locked 
up most of the alternative suppliers. The end-
of-year results spoke for themselves: Ericsson 
reported losses, blaming component shortag-
es, while Nokia increased its handset market 
share, thanks to quick thinking in the face of 
a freak event.
To build a resilient organization, try to 
keep some resources in reserve. Being too fat 
is not good, but neither is having no fat. In ad-
dition, have systems that acknowledge and 
adapt to problems rather than hiding them. 
This implies a culture of transparency, so 
that covering up problems becomes difficult. 
Rather than scapegoating, firms need a culture 
where people feel free to admit mistakes with 
minimal fear of being penalized. Decentraliza-
tion also allows adaptation to problems as and 
when they occur.
Draw on Past Experiences
Throughout this discussion, it’s important to 
remember that while risks – strategic or other-
wise – can be predicted (to some extent) and 
managed (also to some extent), they are risks 
precisely because they cannot be completely 
anticipated or controlled. Perhaps the biggest 
takeaway from this article is that we can never 
completely eliminate risk – but we can build 
adaptability and resilience into our organiza-
tions and management systems. 
As a final thought, remember that if your 
firm is in business today, it has survived the 
worst recession since the Great Depression. 
In other words, your firm has survived the 
70-year storm. Rushing to reduce future risks 
based on experience in the 2008 global finan-
cial crisis could easily result in overreaction 
– an example of locking the barn door after 
the horse has bolted. Indeed, if your firm did 
not experience difficulties in the recession, it 
probably was not taking enough risk. Instead 
of rushing into a massive risk-management 
exercise, try to target your risk management 
activities to emphasize the strategic issues 
that will determine organizational survival.  
To build a resilient organization, try to keep some 
resources in reserve. In addition, have systems that 
acknowledge and adapt to problems rather than hiding 
them. This implies a culture of transparency.
